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not relevant here, the State's approximately 7,400 licensed real
estate brokers and sales agents may use only those forms approved
by the Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General in real
estate transactions conducted in this State.

Utah Code Ann, §

61-2-20 (1953, as amended),
3.

On or about February 20, 1987, First Security

Mortgage Company, Respondent's predecessor-in-interest, as
seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer, executed an Earnest
Money Sales Agreement (the "Agreement") on the form approved by
the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General pursuant
to the statutes referenced in Paragraph 2 above.

(See Br. in

Opp. at 3, paragraph 1; Petition at 3, paragraph 1)

A copy of

the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
4.

Before closing a survey disclosed that there was a

boundary discrepancy with respect to the property subject to the
Agreement.

(Br. in Opp. at 4-5; Petition at 4, paragraph 4)
5.

Also before closing, neighboring property owners

apparently cut off the water supply to the property, causing a
pond to dry up, thereby damaging the property.

(Br. in Opp. at

4-5; Petition at 5, paragraph 6)
6.

On or about September 22, 19 87, Kelley brought

this action seeking a declaration of the parties' respective
rights and obligations under the Agreement, specific performance
2

of the Agreement and damages for alleged breaches,

(Br. in Opp.

at 7; Petition at 9, paragraph 20)
7-

The trial court granted Kelley summary judgment on

his claim of specific performance, and ordered First Security to
convey the property to Kelley.

The court reserved the question

of Kelley's entitlement to an abatement of the purchase price of
damages.

Kelley and First Security then settled the damage

issue, and final judgment was entered on May 6, 1988.

(Petition

at 9, paragraphs 22 and 23)
8.

Thereafter, Respondent, Leucadia Financial

Corporation, was substituted as defendant for First Security and
appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Kelley.

(Petition at 10, paragraph 24)
9.

On or about January 5, 1990, the Utah Court of

Appeals filed its Opinion in this case.

A copy of the Opinion is

attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
10.

In its Opinion the Court of Appeals concluded that

a buyer under the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement could
not obtain specific performance upon discovery of defects
rendering title uninsurable, but was limited by the language of
the Agreement to return of his earnest money deposit or
acceptance of the property subject to the defects.
at 3)
3

(Exhibit "B"

11.

On May 9, 1990, the Utah Real Estate Commission

passed a Resolution, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "C", requesting that the Attorney General take such
action and file such papers as are necessary to obtain review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals,
12,

On May 22, 1990, Mr. Blaine Twitchell, Director of

the Division, wrote a letter to David W. Lund, Assistant Attorney
General-

The letter requests that the Attorney General file a

brief of amicus curiae on behalf of the Division, and sets forth
the Division's position with respect to the Opinion of the Court
of Appeals,

A copy of the letter is attached hereto as

Exhibit "D".
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals because the decision incorrectly interprets the
language of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement to
eliminate the recognized right of a buyer to seek specific
performance.
ARGUMENT
The Division is charged, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2-5 (1953, as amended),

with the responsibility of

administration and enforcement of Utah's real estate licensing
laws.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-20 (1953, as amended), administered
4

and enforced by the Division, provides in relevant part that,
"Real estate licensees may fill out those forms approved by the
Utah Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General and those
forms provided by statutes . . ."

The Earnest Money Sales

Agreement at issue in this case, was on the form approved by the
Utah Real Estate Commission and the Utah Attorney General's
Office pursuant to the foregoing statute.
In rendering its decision in this case, the Utah Court
of Appeals, interpreting Paragraph H of the Agreement (a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit " A " ) , held that when title
cannot be made insurable, a buyer's only remedies are acceptance
of the property with waiver of defects or termination of the
agreement with a refund of the earnest money deposit, not
specific performance.

(Exhibit "B" at 3)

This interpretation of

the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement effectively requires a
buyer to waive his or her right to specific performance, and is
contrary to the long established rule that "a vendee has the
right to insist upon performance by the vendor to the extent that
the latter is able to perform with an abatement in the purchase
price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect,"

Castaqno

v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976).
This Court has consistently held that a buyer under a
contract for the sale of real estate may specifically enforce
5

such an agreement.

See, e.g., Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427

(Utah 1980); Tanner v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980): Reed
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); and Huck v. Hayes, 560 P.2d
1124 (Utah 1977).
The Division believes that the Court of Appeals
incorrectly interpreted one provision of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement in isolation, without regard to other relevant
provisions contained therein.

(See Exhibit "D")

Specifically,

Paragraphs "N" and "P" of the Agreement provide guidance as to
the proper interpretation of the Agreement.

For example,

Paragraph N provides in relevant part that, "Both parties agree
that, should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which
may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement,
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise."
(Exhibit "A" at Paragraph "N") (emphasis added).

The language of

Paragraph "H", read in context with the language of Paragraph
"N", illustrates the intent of the drafters of the Agreement to
preserve a buyer's right to specific performance as provided "by
applicable law."

Id.

6

The effect of the Court of Appeals' decision is a shift
in the balance of rights, remedies and obligations between the
buyer and seller in favor of the seller.

Such a shift was

neither contemplated nor intended by the drafters of the
Agreement,

(See

Exhibit "D" at page 2)

Silence in Paragraph

"H" as to the right of a buyer to specific performance should not
be construed to exclude that remedy.

Such a result is in

conflict with other sections of the Agreement, and is in direct
contravention of Utah case law allowing specific performance with
an abatement of the purchase price.

Reversal of the Court of

Appeals' decision is particularly appropriate if, as is alleged
by Kelley, the decision (and its consequent impact on Utah real
property transactions) was made sua sponte, without the aid of
briefs, oral argument or the raising of the dispositive issues by
the parties.

(See Petition at 13-17)

Finally, Leucadia's argument that the Court of Appeals'
decision has little precedential value because it is an
unpublished opinion is incorrect.

(Br. in Opp. at 29)

While the

Division recognizes the existence and effect of Rule 4-508 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which provides that
unpublished opinions have no precedential value, as a practical
matter, the decision indicates how the Court of Appeals would
react to a similar situation in the future.
7

Leucadia's argument

also ignores the fact that this Court could issue a published
opinion upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
same grounds, and that such an opinion would obviously constitute
precedent.

The decision of the Court of Appeals f published or

unpublished, therefore, remains a concern to the Division.
CONCLUSION
This case presents important questions regarding the
interpretation of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement used
by real estate agents and brokers in the vast majority of real
estate transactions in this State.

Because the interpretation

given the Agreement of the Court of Appeals incorrectly alters
Utah law regarding availability of specific performance, this
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision.
DATED this

ll

day of

Xfe%v> ^K./"~

1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
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Assistant Attorney General
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Attorneys for
Real Estate
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EXHIBIT "A

EARNEL

MONEY SALES AGRE 71EN1
Legend

Yes (X)

No (0)

This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

m

REALTOR0

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)

I N C L U D E D I T E M S . Unless exduded herein, this sale shall iocludt alt fixtures and any of the following hems if presently attached to the property: plumbing,
g. air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies
>ds. window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door
r and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs.
I N S P E C T I O N . Unless otherwise indicated. 8uyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by
i of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, sue. location, present value, future value, income
om or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as i s " condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires
dditional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
SELLER W A R R A N T I E S . Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no daim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which
iot or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances
/ nature shall be brought current on or before dosing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances
be sound or in satisfactory working condition at dosing.
. C O N D I T I O N OF W E L L . Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers" knowledge, provided an adequate supply of
- and continued use of the well or wells h authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
. C O N D I T I O N OF SEPTIC TANK. Seder warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and
r has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and constnjction standards.
. ACCELERATION CLAUSE, No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing.
r shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts agamst the property require the
ent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the
t of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after notice of
vaiver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to dedare this Agreement null and void b y giving written notice
tiler or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions
aid "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
5. TTTLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Aqreement. but not less than three (3) days prior to dosing. Buyer
I have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract pf thie brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary tide report on the subject property.
:r shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller
teller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at dosing, to cure th<
ct(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the optior
\e Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
"I. TTTLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALT/
cy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other that
* provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances Of defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable througf
rscrow agreement at dosing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreemer
'< thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
I. EXISTING T E N A N T LEASES, (f Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) day
r Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to dosing, e copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affectin
property. Unless written objection ts given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to sue
;es. If objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void.

id

! Y«*<)Q

EARNEST M O N E Y RECEIPT

-No(OJ

. •/r&zZu<f£Y ?-&

OATE:

S/JLL.

\e undersigned Buyer,

/^^y^^^cl

T

fcrzt r v

-

hereby jJeposits with Brokerage
2 _

k f\NEST

MONEY_the amount[of
of A
4r*^f*
\JT /
— ' fl A>>—-ft 2* / ^ *^/4*^%Js>^6*~
e form of

s?^^

Oollars

{%j&,G&<=?M~~y

j»Auch shall be deposited in actnce
corda
n appltcable State. Law.
with

?
f / y < ^ - £ j C * +
srage

*&>/-

6 HP-

ZC7S7Z
<k?S& [

Z W

i
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
sa^

J-S^£

.

. Received by

(/

O

~

' Phone Number

I

^

:

TTT

^

OFFER TO PURtQHASE *

The above stated EARNEST MONEY js^given to secure and apply on the purchase of th£ property situated a

"

I

in the City eW"

iS^k

&Ty

'

'

r y ^ t y 'of <~Tcss*f **'7~

'urzik.

c t t o any restrictive covenants; zoning regulations, utility or other aasements or nghts of way/government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer
sordance with. Section: G. Said property ts more particularly tiescribed-as: ,
HECK APPUCABUE BOXES:

C3 Vacant Lot

I I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY

D Commercial . . ^ R e s i d e n t i a l

Included h e m e

.

z

z—

O Vacant Acreage

O Other _

qOther

OCondo

Unless exciuded below, this sale shall include all fixtures ^ad any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property.

The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to tide: /rXz,

(b).

• ~

-

I UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

(a)

:

Exdud^d hems.

/ T / ^ ^ y ^

The following items are specifically excluded from this tale:

CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES ANO OTHER RIGHTS Setter represents that the property 'includes the following tmprovements in the purchase pnce:
^electricity ^ c o n n e c t e d
J-Xjwell ^connected Oother
CB irrigation water/secondary system
pQjngress & egress by pnvate easement
^septic tank ^ c o n n e c t e d
<c)

$ public sewer C& connected

pother sanitary systern
Ppublic water reconnected

. 4S o f shares
Company:
^ B T V antenna Omaster antenna Dprewired

^r^JD dedicated road^ O paved

jjrarivate water

^ . n a t u r a l gas ^fcLconnecteoL

. M o t h e r rights

(d)- Survey.
• (ej

^connected

poor'to closing. ^D shall-not "be-furcttshed

A certified survey ^Sjshall be fumis^f"aT"tfie^expeV\s>r^>f^^^/-/- f\Zs.

Buyer: Inspection

Buyer has made a visual inspection xrfthe property-and subject to Section 1 (cj above and 6-"be(ow. accepts, it in -its present physic*

condition, except.

2.

— — . — — — _ _ _ _ _ — _ —

PURCHASE PRICE ANO FINANCING.

The total purchase pnce for the property ts -~~<Zl^-^ ollars

j*\6o<

which represents the aforedesenbed EARNEST MONEY OEPOSIT

IFQ c?rsn
c*—

O principal.

D interest.

O insurance.

i

O con do fees

O other

representing the approximate balance of an additional exesting mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b

wh*ch irvdude

^principal

- D t n t e r e s t . Ottxes;

% pe* enoum with monthly payments-ol $
OiersucBoce:. 'Ocondo f«es*

representing balance if any, including proceeds from a new

w

o

jP70/v

&

£

.) which shall be paid as follows

% per annum w<th monthly payments of *

O taxes.

assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears -interest « * .

~jr<MS0

~r

representing the approximate balance of CASH D O W N PAYMENT at dosing.

by buyer, which obligation bears interest at

_2l

f^r-fl^^^i
O o o—

&

pepresonung the approximate balance- of >an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real esrate contract or other encumbrance to be assume

wh«ch incJude
^2^.

iS

O c u r b and gutter

:

z

Oother.

loan to be paid as. follows

/fe
(7/. o r / ^

&Q&

TOTAL PURCHASE PR.CE

8*Y**-

" ' Z J ^

^

r

' ^

7?

7>*r

me and
and i£>If Buyer ts required to assome en underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume end/o^ procure same
•r is made subject to Buyer qualifying for .and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application wtthmi .
fS after Seller s acceptance of th<s Agreement, to assume the underlying obl«oetion and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed
3uyer does ncr quahfy for the assumpTion and/or financing wuh<n
the option of the Buyer or SeUecupon
:y<tupOf wnnen notice
Seller agrees to psy s

X

/t

—^

days after Seller s accepiance of this Agreement thts Agreement sn^l be vo<d«b

towards Buye< s total financing and closing costs. «ocfudmq but not l«m<ted to loar\ discount points
—c rK- a<^c.,moni-*-> nf mn #Ti« ( nn loan or ob(<oai*on on tne on>Dertv S-oct«on F shall apply

^ciVSXC TOmraCT- " • • - ^ - T ' C T f '
."
«
rty-.**</tfject to encumbrances antt cxcept«ons n
f o u g h t cuffed
with an attorney's opinion ( S *

c i„ <.
^c
Serein, e*«denced b y J Q a current policy of tide in'
action H).

. ^
zc «n the amount of purchase p r i c e / = \ a n abstract

• INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing
shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer Q h a s ^ h a s not .reviewed a n y condom CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement.
.VESTING OF TITLE. . Title shall vest in Buyer a s

follows

, s4* Ps£?dTr/>

S'PAY*

f£l&/£

SELLER WARRANTIES. " In addition t o warranties contained in Section C. the following h e m s are also warranted

.

f^^,^<:

: 4S0si7£L

^&A/£L

cions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.

To

This offeV is made subject to the following special conditions a n d / o r contingencies which must

isfied prior to d o s i n g :

Z__ZZI2ZZ
CLOSING OF SALE.* This Agreement "shall b e d o s e d on or "before.
; a reasonable location to be'designa'ted" by'
. subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance
his Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R. shafl-be m a d e a s of g f date of p o s s e s s i o n f ^ d a t e of d o s i n g ^ } other

3.

POSSESSION.

Seller shall deliver p o s s e s s i o n to Buyer on

3: GENERAL PROVISIONS.
sment by reference.
\.

dt'f^g

. u n l e s s txxeadtd

C-L.

- •

by written a g r e e m e n t of parties.

Unless otherwise indicated a b o v e , the General Provision S e c t i o n s o n the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this
. . .
.
. . . . .

AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME U M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE.

have.until iiu

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the a b o v e terms and conditions. Seller

. to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the

T
itufe*Wi

XT*

:K"ONE

Date

Signature of Buyer

"

-

.

CEPTANCE OF.OFFER.TO PURCHASE: S e l l e r hereby-ACCEPTS the foregoing offer o n the terms and conditions specified a b o v e .
JECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing o f f e r . ^ -

• — "(Scim 'simtialsj

JUNTEROFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer-SUBd£CT.TO the- exceptions or-modifications a s specified b e l o w or y\ t h £ attached Addendum, and
rsems said, COUNTER-OFFER for Buyer's acceptance.-Buyer .-shall, have-until
Jtr

eofied below.

^

<jj*

~p-

t
fy

,

St?'*4
/

(A.M.rT^Q .
/

'

— £ ' o ^ c z*cu^ uJ^-^*j

V~-2;

Signature of Seller

?^olS?

1 9 < £ _ Z _ to accept .the. terms
/

J J r

I ' ^ c a ' J^ : £?^^c<_

^

-

"

/^r 'rs^f^^it-

f*"^l

Signature of Seller

CK ONE:
uyer accepts the counter offer
uyer accepts with mocVficatioos o n attached a d d e n d u m
e

IS4 }Q

A

\ 7

S«gaaiurc of Buyer^

(AM.PM)

C O M M I S S I O N * \ T h e undersigrved hereby agrees to pay tir _^
>mm<sSiOn nf

'

/ ^

*

^ fl f/

2
:^r^

g

S*goature of Buyer

__(£rokerace

. as consideration for the efforts in procunng a buyer.

Z.^c'-^l.
nature of Setfer
•

lOate
"

Oat

SignatAjre of Seller

O O C U M E N T RECEIPT

State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer a(>d Seller wtth c o p i e s of this-Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the follow<ng elternetrves must therefor
^omple:ed).
A J3^ acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
NATURE OF SELLER

S I Q N A U ^ E OF B U X E r i ?
Oate
Oate

6

n / rvrsorvalfv caused

a final coov'of the foreoo«oo Aoreement bearmq ad signatures to be ma<(ed o n .

|

S

z

i%u,
Date
Oate

19.

-? ?

AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this A g r ^ ^ ^ warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller.
COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersed
and
any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which mod'fv
l this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shad be in writing and. H attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this
tent not expressly modified or txdud^d thertio.
'
DEFAULT/tNTERPLEAOER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated
•s or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of defauft by Seller, or if this sale fails to dose because of the nonsatisfaction of any
condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit
; returned to Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall
costs and expenses, induding a rtzsooMbte attorney's fee. which may Brlst or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any
' provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy h pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest
deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller
re the prindpal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount
«it remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting
lall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action.
ABROGATION.

Execution of a final real estate contract if any. shall abrogate this Agreement

RISK O F LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until dosing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property
n the date hereof and the date of dosing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed
rcent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction rf Seller agrees in writing to repair or
i damaged property prior to dosing, or dedare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent ( 1 0 % ) of the purchase price
tiler agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
T I M E I S OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE OELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be dosed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport
. fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing date shall
tnded seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter.
; of the essence. This provision rebates only to the extension of dosing date. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed
slivered by all parties to the transaction.
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs
•iding title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by^elleTTTaxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer,
and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated 9S set forth in Section 8 . Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mongage or other reserves
>e assigned to Buyer at dosing.
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than
excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) spedal
-vty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
xisting real estate contract therein.
AGENCY DISCLOSURE.
BROKERAGE.
DAYS.

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller.

For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office.

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays

E FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.

T H I S F O R M HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION'

A JENDUM/COUNTEROFFE.
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Th<s A O D E N O U M / C O U N T E R O F F E R constitutes

(Y)

a C O U N T E R OFFER

SALES A G R E E M E N T (THE A G R E E M E N T ) dated t h e .
Q

\(e\\e\i

r

y r .

day of

firfarx

(

J an A O O E N O U M to that EARNEST M O N E Y
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as buyer (s). and F i r s 4 l ^ C C u r < 4 : y
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O D n k .

between i Q ( ( ! I H f l D

Hi- fj-tmh

as seUer(s).

covering real property described as foHows:
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T h e following terms are hereby incorporated as part of T H E A G R E E M E N T :
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3, Current rerh'fieVj survey m i l l bf. p r o v i d e d toy .SepF.^"

All other terms of T H E A G R E E M E N T shall remain the same t ^ t S e l l e p < ) _ B u y e r shall have until
)Or<l

M

Y~\ ^

Signature of (^{) Setter (
5'GD

(i*r+rt-/P.M.)

1 9 ^ X to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this A d d e n d u m shall lapse

Date.
T.me

.*? '.ClC)

-

<*-R1./P.M.)

A^MTt

) Buyer

C < ^ W ^ /,T~/

ii^Z^^Z

ACCEPTANCE .COUNTEROFFER

^

REJECTION

Check One
( / s j 1 hereby A C C E P T the foregoing on the terms specified above
I

) I hereby ACCEPT the foreacyno S U 6 J E C T T O the exceptions shown on the attached A c d e n d u m

(

) ( hereby reject the f o r e g o ^

S'$ni(Uft

//"^

Signature

Dste

Time

(Initials)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
0 \ J I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

Signeturc c( Buyers} jf
(

., \

'/L->t0<are-A,

S^gnai^e o' S€"e«si

J ( personally caused a f/nai cop£ of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be ma<<ed on

^S„x / . by Certifiers ^ai( and return receipt attached hereto to the ( V ) Se<<er (

) Buyer

D^te
/ ^ o y <~* ' J-—^..

EXHIBIT "B"

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAN. • 5 1990

OOOoo
\ ot thm Coon

William R. Kelley, Jr.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Case No- 880534-CA
Leucadia Financial Corporation/
a Delaware corporation.
Defendant and Appellant*

Third District Court/ Summit County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

John A. Snow and Kathryn H. Snedaker/ Salt Lake
City/ for Appellant
David R. Olsen/ Charles P. Sampson/ and Claudia F,
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Bench/ and Jackson*
JACKSON/ Judge:
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)* appeals a
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley*s damages as an
issue to be tried/ but the parties settled that issue out of
court prior to the appeal. We reverse.
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties'
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not
marketable.
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the
interest of the original seller. First Security Mortgage
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the
seller.

The property contemplated by the parties in their sales
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadia*s property
description did not include certain acreage containing a
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the
adjoining property owner. Thereafter/ Leucadia initiated
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to
flow from their contract•
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects
or to return Kelley*s earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously,
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the
parties' rights under the terms of the contract, and (2)
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as
declared.
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not
convey clear and marketable title to all the property.
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties'
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular
weight and review the determination under a correctness
standard. &££ Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a
question of law. Faulkner v, Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293
(Utah 1983). "We find, as r matter of law, no ambiguity in the
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable.
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v,
Kahan, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive.
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co,. 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document

itself. Bio Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv
Corp,, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we turn
to the terms to which these parties agreed.
.Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing,
including how the parties would deal with any title defect that
appeared: *If said defect is not curable through an escrow
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance)
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title:
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed; was
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific
performance.
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties,
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are meritless or
that they do not require our consideration in light of the
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties* agreement.3

2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender,
where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder, 121 Utah Adv.
Rep, 16 (Ct. App. 1989), ai. . Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 119 Utah
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989). See also. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-1 (1987).
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining
landowner, which diverted the water and dried up the pond.
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties' agreement provided a
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior
to closing. Kelley did not seek to use that procedure.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe
the remedy of specific performance is available.
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties'
remedies at law to the terms of the contract. If there was a
"defect* in Leucadia«s title, the contract permits Kelley to:
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2)
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream,
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no
"defect" in Leucadia's title. £££_ Black's Law Dictionary 1332
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title).
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy,
the trial court could order specific performance of the
contract.
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. See generally
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). "The rule

has been long established that a vendee has the right to insist
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the
value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno v. Church, 552
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976); £££fllfiflIn re Havhurst's Estate.
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White, 26 Wash, App.
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980).
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by
the parties.

KU^C
Russell W. Bench, Judge

EXHIBIT "C

RESOLUTION
Be It resolved by the Utah Real Estate Commission as
follows:
Whereas, the Utah Real Estate Commission has
reviewed the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Case Number 880534-CA; and
Whereas, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
that case purports to give an interpretation of
the standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement
which
interpretation severely limits the rights
of buyers to specific performance thereunder; and
Whereas, the Standard form Earnest Money Sales
Agreement is a form document approved by the Utah
Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General
for the State of Utah; and
Whereas, the Utah Real Estate Commission is
gravely concerned with the decision of the Court
of Appeals as it relates to its Interpretation of
the standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement
which form Is used by real estate salesagents
throughout the State of Utah; and
Whereas, it is in the best interest of the Real
Estate Industry
In the State of Utah that the
Utah Supreme Court review the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals as it relates to Its
interpretation of the standard form Earnest Money
Sales Agreement limiting the rights of buyers to
specific performance; and
Now therefore, the Utah Real Estate Commission
does hereby resolve that the Attorney General for
the State of Utah be requested to take such
action and file such papers as are necessary and
appropriate to* obtain a review of the this
decision by the Utah Supreme Court, and to allow
the State of Utah to provide such input, and to
assert
its position regarding the interpretation
and enforceability of the standard form Earnest
Money Sales Agreement and the rights of buyers to
obtain specific performance thereunder.
in witness whereof the undersigned members of the
Utah Real Estate Commission have set their hands
on this 9th day of May, 1990.
U/ILYP-/L
/JOU^<
Fredrick "Buck" Froerer,

I

Pau i Neufenschwander

feeth

Tolbert

EXHIBIT "D

State of Utah

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Real Estate
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor
David L. Buhler
Executive Director
Blame E. Twitchell

HeoerM Weils Building
160 East 300 South/P O Box 45802
Sa't Lake Cay Uta^ 84145-0802
(801)530-6747

May 22,

1990

David W. Lund, Esq.
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE:

Amicus brief

Dear Mr. Lund:
The Division of Real Estate hereby requests the Attorney
General
to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Division In Kelley v.
Leucadla Financial Corp., Case No. 880534-CA (Utah App. 1990). We
are concerned
that
the decision by the Court of Appeals In that
case Is incorrect and will drastically alter the rights of buyers
of real property in the State of Utah.
The Court of Appeals decision was based on an Interpretation of
one of the general provisions In the standard form Earnest Money
Sales Agreement which all real estate licensees in Utah must use.
The
form contract
was approved by the Attorney General and the
Utah Real Estate Commission.
The State
therefore
has a keen
interest
in the integrity of the contract.
The Division believes
that the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted one provision of
the contract
in isolation without
regard to a number of other
provisions in the contract.
The result of this Interpretation is to limit the rights which a
buyer
of
real
property
has upon default
by the seller.
Historically, buyers have had a number of remedies
available to
them when a seller fails to perform.
Buyers have been able to sue
for rescission of the contract, for money damages, or for specific
performance of the contract.
In the Ke11ey case, the Court of
Appeals interpreted the language of the standard form contract to
say
that
if a seller
defaults because of a title problem, the
buyer may not sue for specific performance.
The Court stated that
the buyer's only
remedy
is a return
of his earnest money.
Presumably the buyer could not sue for damages under
the Court's
interpretation of the contract.
This decision moves Utah back toward the days of "buyer
beware".
If the buyer defaults, the seller may elect a number of remedies,

Including specific performance or suing
the buyer
for damages.
Yet, if the seller defaults, the buyer would be limited to getting
his earnest money back and walking away from the transaction. The
effect
of
the Court of Appeals decision could be to dramatically
shift the balance of rights in favor of
sellers
in real
estate
transact ions.
It was not the Intent of either the committee which
drafted
the
Earnest Money
Sales Agreement or the Utah Real Estate Commission
to limit the buyer's remedies. There was no discussion
before
either
body about
limiting the buyer to a refund of his earnest
money if the seller defaulted because of a title problem.
Quite
the contrary,
there was considerable discussion about making the
contract one contract which evenly balanced
seller's
rights and
buyer's
rights and which would protect both parties equally. The
provision upon which the Court of Appeals based its decision was
put
into the contract to protect buyers of real estate, but the
court has interpreted that provision to give sellers an unfair
advantage over buyers.
The Division
of
Real
Estate
respectfully
requests
that
the
Attorney General
file an amicus brief on its behalf in this case
arguing that the Court of Appeals interpretation
of
the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement is incorrect and against public policy
Sincerely,
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

/Twi tche 1 I
Di rector
skwlet.ag

